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IMAGINATION, MORALITY, AND THE SPECTRE OF SADE IN GEORGE
ELIOT'S ROMOLA AND DANIEL DERONDA
By Margaux Fragoso
In her final book, Impressions of Theophrastus Such, George Eliot vocalizes her contempt for
writers who dismiss morality 'as a sort of twaddle for bibs and tuckers, a doctrine of dulness,
a mere incident in human stupidity' (Impressions 134). It is well known that Eliot subscribed
to a complex system of morals that each successive novel brings closer to fruition. Eliot's last
novel Daniel Deronda is her closest inspection of the conflict between egoism and morality. It
explores the psyche of a woman who is made to develop moral sensibilities: Gwendolen's
'bad' luck in marrying Grandcourt creates conditions that foster her spiritual and moral growth.
Romola presents an inversion of this theme: Tito Melema is the recipient of many 'lucky'
occurrences such as political connections, marriage to a beautiful wife, money; all of this
assists in the cultivation of evil in Tito: every success leads him farther from any kind of
redemption. With all this emphasis on contingency, it should come as no surprise that Daniel
Deronda opens with Gwendolen at a roulette table losing her money: unlike Tito she will suffer
a run of bad luck, and also unlike Tito, she will have an opportunity to redeem herself.
The Marquis de Sade also deals with issues of contingency, destiny, and morality but unlike
Eliot, Sade sees morality as a static trait, which is clearly illustrated in lustine, or the
Misfortunes of Virtue, 1787. Bad luck and the resultant agonies at the hands of her malefactors
produce no palpable change in the victimized Iustine's code of unceasingly ineffective moral
principles. As noted above, Eliot presents the acquisition of morality as a lifelong process often
facilitated by suffering. To her, morality is dynamic and ever-changing: an initially kindhearted character such as Tito may become evil due to poor choices; and inversely, an egoistic
and sometimes cruel person like Gwendolen Harleth can develop a system of morals. Sade
portrays morality as consistently flat and empty as a value: despite incredible torture, the
virtuous Iustine's morals are fixed; she never adapts her morality to suit the demands her
environment presses on her. To Sade, morality is a form of idiocy, even lunacy; whereas to
Eliot, morality is the highest form of intelligence and creative capacity: characters like
Dorothea and Maggie, both presented as intrinsically moral, continue to adjust their moral
systems based on the needs unsuitable environments have engendered in them: Dorothea
marries the morally inferior Will, Maggie continues to visit Philip in the Red Deeps in direct
opposition to her brother's wishes. Eliot views morality as an active force directly linked with
and fed by the imagination while Sade perceives the opposite: it is immorality that is based on
the imaginative faculties; morality lacks any creative agency and is therefore incapable of
invention. Their systems are so diametrically opposed that reading Sade in conjunction with
Eliot creates a compelling dialectic: what is the relationship of morality to imagination?
I will now point to evidence that suggests Eliot read Sade and was perhaps even influenced by
his work. In the chapter, 'Moral Swindlers' of Impressions, Eliot in the voice of Theophrastus,
puts forth the proposition:
Suppose a Frenchman-I mean no disrespect to the great French nation, for all
nations are afflicted with their peculiar parasitic growths which are lazy,
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hungry forms, usually characterized by a disproportionate swallowing
apparatus: suppose a Parisian who should shuffle down the Boulevard with a
soul ignorant of the gravest cares and the deepest tenderness of manhood, and
a frame more or less fevered by debauchery, mentally polishing into utmost
refinement of phrase and rhythm verses which were an enlargement on that
Shaksperian motto, and worthy of the most expensive title to be furnished by
the vendors of such authentic ware as Les marguerites de l'Enfer, or Les
Delicacies de Beelzebuth. (135-136)
Editor Nancy Henry points out that these are mock variations of Baudelaire's poems; however,
Les Delicacies de Beezlebuth could also refer to Sade's La Philosophie dans le Boudoir or
Justine, ou Les Malheurs de la Vertu. Indeed, Eliot finds fault with several French authors as
indicated by the plural 'parasitic growths' and in Debasing the Moral Currency, she observes
'that even now much nonsense and bad taste win admiring acceptance solely by virtue of the
French language' (81).
As a lover of French culture, it comes as no surprise that Eliot would familiarize herself with
its decadent underbelly. The Oxford Reader's Companion to George Eliot asserts that Eliot saw
French literature as 'one of the three greatest literatures in the world together with English and
German' (RignallI27) and that 'her knowledge of it, acquired through a lifetime's reading was
unrivalled among English writers of her time' (127). Steven Marcus claims in The Other
Victorians that 'French pornographic writings, particularly those by Sade' were 'well known
through the upper reaches of English literary society' (Marcus 37). According to Colette
Michael's annotated bibliography The Marquis de Sade: The Man, His Works and His Critics
most of Sade's major work was published in the late eighteenth century or the early to mid
nineteenth century; and Eliot, who visited France frequently, could have easily accessed it. This
essay will only address works by Sade that were published early enough for Eliot to have read.
Returning to the central issue at hand which is to establish a dialectic between Sade and Eliot
that will illustrate both the thematic similarities and philosophical divergences of their work, I
will now turn to Romola published in 1862, and Daniel Deronda, 1876. These novels are
inverted versions of the same moral dilemma. Tito, assisted by a favourable destiny, follows
his basest instincts (in a truly Sadiean fashion, I may add) and becomes successful but also
unredeemable: a state which is to Romola, and presumably to George Eliot, 'a sorrow that has
no balm in it and that may well make a man say,- "It would have been better for me if I had
never been born'" (Romola 538). Daniel Deronda, instead of being about the spiritual ruin that
is a consequence of egoism, is rather about the birth of conscience that comes from the
destruction of a pathological egotism: this is presented as positive just as Tito's corruption is
obviously negative.
Sade reverses the tenets of this kind of basic morality tale. His major works Juliette, 1797, and
Justine, 1787, are inverted versions of the same story and serve to illustrate, as Maurice
Blanchot contends, 'the basic tenet, the very cornerstone of his work: to Virtue, nothing but
misfortune; to vice the reward of constant prosperity' (Blanchot 44). The converse destinies of
the righteous Justine and her immoral sister Juliette support Sade's conviction that the person
'of absolute egoism can never fall upon evil days', that he or she will 'without exception be
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forever happy and happy to the highest degree' (Blanchot 45). In George Eliot, the opposite
holds true: the egoist's luck always runs out and he inevitably falls victim to the machinery of
events set in motion by his own crimes. A single evil deed will follow one forever, regardless
of any attempt at reconciliation; we see this in Gwendolen, who at the end of Daniel Deronda
cries out in despair, 'I said I should be forsaken. I am a cruel woman. And I am forsaken'
(Deronda 803). Gwendolen is constantly haunted by 'distasteful miserable memories which
forced themselves on her as something more real and ample than new material out of which
she could mould her future' (797). She will never be free from the twofold effects of her
crimes: they have altered her destiny by causing a permanent rift between herself and Daniel,
whom she loves, and they have created within her a superego not unlike the inner critic that
Theophrastus in Impressions identifies as the 'God within, holding the mirror and the scourge'
(Impressions 13). Compare Eliot's idea of the retributive effects of destiny and conscience to
Sade's rhetoric: 'If misery persecutes virtue and prosperity accompanies crime, those two
things being one in Nature's view, far better to join company with the wicked who flourish,
than to be counted among the virtuous who flounder?' (Seaver and Wainhouse 457).
This Sadiean logic is certainly present in Tito when he chooses the easier route of evil although
destiny has intruded: 'He had simply chosen to make life easy to himself-to carry his human
lot, in such a way that it would pinch him nowhere; and the choice had, in various times, landed
him in unexpected positions' (Romola 213). To Sade, the decision to choose evil, as Tito does,
is the wisest choice because it is natural; to act against nature, or impulse, is to defy an inherent
natural logic. In Romola, however, Eliot deconstructs the notion of intellect or imagination as
it relates to the decision to choose evil. Ostensibly, Tito's choice is one that requires intellect;
he must use his imagination to continue to deceive: Eliot refers to these imaginative capacities
as 'the resources of lying' (213) and allows us to see that Tito perceives these resources as a
form of 'ingenuity' (212). So we have no doubt that Eliot, even with her firm sense of what is
moral, can see the artistic and creative properties innate in deception and other forms of
immorality. However, while acknowledging this, Eliot also disparages the artistic quality of
immorality by calling the choice to lie 'easy' and 'habitual' (213). Both these adjectives
indicate that Eliot sees Tito's prepared course of action as not only morally reprehensible, but
also intellectually and imaginatively stunting: Tito's immoral choices reduce him to a
mechanistic impulse that follows a pre-scripted destiny to its unfortunate end. The narrator
articulates Tito's best possible recourse: he should seek out Baldassarre again and confess his
crimes to Romola (212). Because this choice requires the most imagination, and Tito lacks this
capacity, he 'never (thinks) of that' (212). Romola's narrator also suggests that 'repentance
which cuts off all moorings to evil demands something more than selfish fear' (212) and though
this 'something' is not overtly stated, we can safely conjecture that the narrator is talking about
the kind of intelligence that only arises with moral awareness. In Impressions, Eliot takes a firm
stance on this issue when she meditates on the dissolution of morality within popular art: 'One
[absurdity] is, the notion that there is a radical, irreconcilable opposition between intellect and
morality' (134).
If Sade and others like him value the argument that immorality is the highest form of art, we
will see the foundation of this kind of philosophy undercut again and again by close
examination of Eliot's texts. The fact that the choice to be altruistic requires the imagination is
one that Eliot first explores in The Lifted Veil. Narrated by the socially alienated Latimer, the
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purpose of this story is to prove that even if one were able to see into the thoughts and emotions
of others, this gift would be worthless without the imagination required to obtain a sense of
fellowship. A precursor to the outward malevolence of Grandcourt, Latimer's thoughts are an
exposition of how someone like Grandcourt would perceive the world. Compare Latimer's
view of humanity to Grandcourt's:
when the rational talk, the graceful attentions, the wittily-turned phrases, and
the kindly deeds which used to make the web of their characters, were seen as
thrust asunder by a microscopic vision, that showed all the immediate
frivolities, all the suppressed egoism, all the struggling chaos of puerilities,
meanness, vague capricious memories and indolent make-shift thoughts, from
which human words and deeds emerge like leaflets covering a fermenting heap.
(Veil 14)

[Grandcourt's] mind was much furnished with a sense of what brutes his fellow
creatures were, both masculine and feminine, what odious familiarities they
had, what smirks, what modes of flourishing their handkerchiefs, what
costume, what lavender water, what bulging eyes, and what foolish notions of
making themselves agreeable by remarks which were not wanted. (Deronda
671)
While Latimer remains passive in his disdain for humanity, Grandcourt channels this negative
energy into a form of creativity that consists of tormenting others. Both above ideologies are
Sadiean in their construction. The evolution from the innocuous Latimer to the malicious
Grandcourt shows that in her final novel, Eliot is ready to explore the kind of evil that is
derived from such a view of humanity. Latimer's identity is built upon the fact that he fancies
himself a poet, but Grandcourt has no identity except his inert role as 'gentleman' and this leads
to a dangerous kind of boredom.
The creative possibilities of evil are limitless and this is one of the arguments Sade uses to
construct a claim that evil is derived from the creative intellect. He builds this argument by
displaying the variety of tortures the imagination can invent and justifying these inventions by
identifying them as products of nature. Clement in Justine uses promotion of freedom and
imagination as a cover for the horrors that will surely come about if man is allowed to follow
whatever base invention his mind can conjure up and rationalize it as creative: 'If we admit that
the senses' joy is always dependent upon the imagination, one must not be amazed by the
numerous variations the imagination is apt to suggest' (qtd. in Seaver and Wainhouse 601).
Clement goes on to talk about 'tastes' and pages later, it is revealed that one's personal taste
can certainly include brutality, for how is one to condemn a man for personal taste? According
to Clement, the 'voluptuous egoist' is 'persuaded [that] his pleasures will be keen insofar as
they are entire' (606); this need for a sense of fullness within self affords him the right to
impose 'the strongest possible dose of pain upon the employed object.' The egoist's existence
is confirmed by the sensations, painful or pleasurable, that he produces in another being; since
pain creates more of an emotional response and is therefore a more authentic confirmation, it
is preferable to the sadist to cause pain. Without this sense of mastery over the beings that
reflect back to him his own presence, this kind of egoist has no sense of self to speak of, no
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way of exerting his imagination.
This kind of worldview can be most directly applied to Grandcourt but as mentioned
previously, the meditations necessary to form his character germinated in Eliot's earlier egoists.
Latimer's self-absorption results in shuddering disgust for humankind, a shrinking of the self
ever inward. In Romola, the egoist in question, Tito, is more interested in producing
pleasurable effects on others than painful ones and to be loved rather than hated; ironically, his
desire to obtain the kind of acceptance that will allow his ego to prosper creates his need to
deceive others. Though Tito's intention is to be loved, Eliot does not fail to see the egoism
inherent in both the need to create favourable feelings in others and in Grandcourt's case, to
design torments that will allow his will to flourish through its sense of mastery. Both forms of
egoism are presented as equally destructive and in both cases, the characters die because of the
vengeances they have inspired (though in Grandcourt's case, it is not made certain whether he
was murdered or simply allowed to die, but in either case, he would have lived had Gwendolen
not wished his death).
Clement admits that 'the most extraordinary thing is to find admirers' (601) but he attempts to
decide what should be the recourse of those who 'know full well they are not loved or not
lovable' (605). To Sade, the solution to this dilemma involves the relinquishment of the need
for love and the ability to settle instead for 'isolated enjoyment' (604), or enjoyment that is
limited solely to the gratification of one's own ego, disregarding the other's ego completely in
its appetites. Tito most explicitly demonstrates that if the egoist's wish for adoration is not
satisfied through love, he will resort to holding power over another person. It is Tito's
conclusion when confronted with his wife's loss of love for him that 'marriage must be a
relation either of sympathy or conquest' (Romola 391). This idea is also explored in Daniel
Deronda: 'In this critical view of mankind there was an affinity between [Grandcourt] and
Gwendolen' (671). This affinity vanishes when her feeling of kinship changes to scorn. It is the
perception of Gwendolen's growing connection to her fellow beings that makes Grandcourt
more aware of the freakishness of his own alienated state. We can speculate that Grandcourt's
consciousness is occasionally penetrated by flashes of his difference, and thereby, separation
from, the human race. The person that cannot connect in any other way will attempt extremes
in order to forge a union: this is Clement's point when he presents the question: 'How should
the aged or so many deformed or defective persons be able to enjoy themselves; for they know
full well they are not loved nor lovable; perfectly certain it is impossible to share their
experience' (qtd. in Seaver and Wainhouse 605). Though this passage is overtly about physical
deformity and physical ugliness, it can be and perhaps is intended to be applied to moral
deformity as well. Uncharacteristically, at one point, Sade allows Clement to admit that certain
tastes are abnormal and perhaps unhealthy when in the past Sade had always defended
barbarous impulses by claiming they are natural. Here we see a speck of illumination into his
own condition enter into Sade's consciousness: 'The man endowed with uncommon tastes is
sick; if you prefer, he is like a woman subject to hysterical vapors' (602). Though most of
Sade's work is geared toward defending his decadence, there is some small part of him that
acknowledges that his proclivities are not natural and not even particularly desirable; that it is,
in fact, more desirable to live within humanity than on the fringes of it: 'What living man
would not instantly revise his tastes, his affections, his penchants and bring them into harmony
with the general scheme, what man rather than continue a freak, would not prefer to be like
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everyone else?' (602).
It is the total disconnection from human fellowship which Eliot finds most damning.
Grandcourt, like Clement in Justine, senses his own deformity (he is no longer able to love or

truly care for anyone), and is angered at the recognition of it that is slowly brought about by
his wife's disgust. To Eliot, no one is entirely unconscious of anything: Theophrastus tells us
that 'even what we are averse to, what we vow not to entertain, must have shaped or shadowed
itself within us as a possibility before we can think of exorcising it' (Impressions 4).
Grandcourt certainly has a general human desire to be admired: in fact, he requires even more
recognition than those whose personhood is situated on firmer ground. His dependence on
others' perceptions is proved through his denial of it: 'Grandcourt went about with the sense
that he did not care a languid curse for anyone's admiration' (585). Undoubtedly, the phrase
'went about' convinces us of the opposite sentiment: in the next line, Eliot demonstrates that
Grandcourt's identity is currently founded on his contempt for mankind: 'the state of noncaring' which is the base of his sense of self 'just as much as desire require[s] its related object'
(585). Furthermore, Grandcourt is painfully conscious of how his every action appears to
others: he 'tenaciously avoid[ed] the possible suggestion to anybody concerned that Deronda's
presence or absence could be of the least importance to him' and since Gwendolen as his wife
is most responsible for preserving his sense of self, her opinion is of prime importance: 'he
made no direct observation to Gwendolen on her behaviour that evening, lest the expression of
his disgust should be a little too strong to satisfy his own pride' (586). Clearly and perhaps
sadly, Grandcourt's current relation to self is wholly based on how he is perceived by other
people as well as his maintenance of a feeling of superiority to and disdain for the rest of
mankind. His dependent, unstable identity is comparable to Theophrastus's example of the
mollusc that is 'inwardly objecting to every other grade of solid other than himself' (41). The
mollusc, whose flimsiness resembles an unstable sense of self, looks on at those beings with a
fixed identity as a quite contemptible species.
At the start of Daniel Deronda Gwendolen is also characterized as having a natural disdain for
her fellow beings but, as Eliot demonstrates, only a few strong attachments to other human
beings are necessary in order to revise this character trait. Gwendolen's two attachments are to
her mother and later to Deronda. Gwendolen's initial attachment to her mother is what, in fact,
prevents her from succumbing to total egoism. It is noteworthy that Eliot uses an event from
Gwendolen's childhood in which she strangles her sister's canary (25) in order to bring out her
egoism. In Sade's Philosophy in the Bedroom, 1795, this example is also used by D01mance to
illustrate that amorality is an inborn trait: 'the infant breaks his toy, bites his nurse's breast,
strangles his canary long before he is able to reason' (qtd. in Seaver and Wainhouse 253). As
earlier stated, it is certainly possible that Eliot could have read this text; regardless of whether
or not she has, the statement 'strangles his canary long before he is able to reason' is useful for
analyzing Gwendolen. Gwendolen, at the start of the novel, is surely not able fully to reason,
because she has not yet developed her imaginative intellect. She cannot envision her action
engendering consequences that will result not only in her sister's unhappiness and the
extinction of the bird's life, but that she herself will never be free from the repercussions of
what she deems an 'infelonious murder' (25); just as years later, she will not be able to imagine
that her betrayal of Lydia Glasher will have inescapable emotional consequences.
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The inability to envision consequences is also an issue explored by Sade; Clement points out
that 'When one wishes to delight in any action whatsoever, there is never a question of
consequences' (qtd. in Seaver and Wainhouse 607). Dolmance in Philosophy in the Bedroom
also expounds on this issue: '[The rascals are inclined] in accordance with natural impulsions
to prefer what they feel to what they do not feel' (252). These infantile attitudes are very
present in Gwendolen's character, although she is shown to be remorseful once she has seen
the negative effects her actions have had on others. Her ability to empathize imaginatively
comes, however, out of this egoism; it is the recognition of her own pain that forces her to
acknowledge pain in others. In Sade, victimizers are not victimized and these favourable
circumstances allow them to maintain a belief in barbarity because it is convenient for them.
After Justine tells Clement she will never accept his 'dangerous lubricity' Clement responds,
'[You will not accept it] because you are afraid of becoming its object, there you have it:
egoism. Let's exchange the roles and you will fancy it very nicely' (qtd. in Seaver and
Wainhouse 608). This argument is faulty, because it assumes that once one knows what it is
like to suffer, one will still remain indifferent to the suffering of others. Eliot's rhetoric would
argue that the experience of prolonged suffering is transformative: it makes a permanent
alteration in the egoist's perception of the self and the others. This is why Eliot's worst villains
tend to be the recipients of good fortune and sometimes come from aristocratic circumstances.
The villain in Silas Mamer is the son of the village squire; Dempster in Scenes of a Clerical
Life only knows what it is like to be a tyrant and not the experience of being bullied; Rosamond
in Middlemarch is spoiled by her parents. Tito, too, is pampered, and though his anguished
moments are portrayed, they fail to convince; like Rosamond, his times of distress are shortlived. Rosamond and Tito manage, for the most part, to manipulate their circumstances in order
to avoid long periods of unhappiness (and in Tito's case, remorse as well); but Gwendolen
cannot escape Lydia Glasher nor can she flee the everyday miseries of living with Grandcourt;
she is literally trapped in and thereby made constantly subject to guilt and suffering.
Daniel Deronda's subtext hints that Grandcourt not only psychologically torments Gwendolen

but that his oppression may include subjecting her to perverse or cruel sexual practices. Rignall
points out that 'there is a suggestion of sexual sadism in the repeated images of horses, reins,
whips, and bridles used to define Grandcourt's subjection of Gwendolen' (RignalI83). Indeed,
it is not farfetched to venture that Grandcourt's perception of Gwendolen as a woman who is
'brought to kneel down like a horse under training for the arena' (320) and his constant
emphasis on his role as 'master' might possibly extend into the bedroom. References to
Gwendolen's fear of Grandcourt suggest this since the rest of the book makes it clear that
Gwendolen is not one who is easily cowed by intimidation. Sexual fright is indicated when
Gwendolen reflects on her current situation:
For she did think of the coming years with presentiment: she was frightened at
Grandcourt. The poor thing had passed from her girlish sauciness of superiority
over this inert specimen of personal distinction into an amazed perception of
her former ignorance about the possible mental attitude of a man towards the
woman he sought in marriage - of her present ignorance as to what their life
with each other might turn into (425).
This passage likely indicates more than moral repulsion; Gwendolen's emotion toward
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Grandcourt has stretched beyond disdain for the man's character and into the realm of terror at
what she perceives lies in store for her as his wife. The use of the adjective 'inert' implies that
Gwendolen underestimated Grandcourt's sexual stamina; it is obvious in the descriptions of her
musings on what married life would be, that she discounted the sexual; and it is possible that
she did so because Grandcourt appeared remote and unenergetic: Gwendolen notices upon
meeting him that it is 'perhaps not possible for a breathing man to look less animated' (111).
There is a lack of visible sexuality in Grandcourt that appeals to Gwendolen: 'He did not
appear to enjoy anything much. That was not necessary: and the less he had of particular tastes
and desires, the more freedom his wife would have in following hers' (137). 'Particular tastes
and desires' seem definitely to include sexuality, and a few lines later she compares Grandcourt
to a lizard and 'not one of the lively, darting kind' (137). It is perhaps Gwendolen's hope that
Grandcourt is impotent. This is shown to be anything but the case: 'the thoughts [Gwendolen's
image] stirred would be imperfectly illustrated by a reference to the amatory poets of all ages'
(319). Might the likes of Baudelaire, Sade, or any other lascivious unnamed French writers that
Theophrastus finds fault with more accurately describe Grandcourt's feelings for Gwendolen?
Grandcourt, like the deviants Sade describes, can only feel alive when he is overriding
another's will or causing pain; otherwise, he is bored to the point of stupefaction. Grandcourt
is not as educated or well-read as he would like to appear to be; instead of developing his
intellect: 'he employed himself (as a philosopher might have done) in sitting meditatively on a
sofa and abstaining from literature' (319). He does this 'not from love of thought, but from
hatred of effort.' Eliot describes this kind of mental sleep as an 'inward world' or a state of
mind composed entirely of the ego, where 'impulse is born and dies in a phantasmal world,
pausing in rejection of even a shadowy fulfillment' (319). This kind of ennui fails to recognize
its own dissatisfaction and remains on the periphery of imagination; but because it is barely
visible makes it no less dangerous: 'a lazy stagnation or even a cottony milkiness may be
preparing one knows not what biting or explosive material' (319). If Grandcourt were to
ground his intellect firmly in the pursuit of knowledge, this rootless imaginative wandering
would not gather destructive momentum. As it stands, Grandcourt's thoughts concerning
Gwendolen 'were like circlets one sees in a dark pool continually dying out and starting again
from some impulse below the surface' (319). Grandcourt's consciousness, depicted as not only
mindless and animalistic in its nature, is seen as repetitive in its processes. These kinds of
obsessive and mechanistic processes are sure to produce only evil; in these short descriptions
of Grandcourt's mental composition, immorality is seen as rooted in ennui: the antidote to
which is education and study. Much later, Eliot italicizes the word 'ennui' when describing our
relation to the 'beings closest to us whether in love or hate' and how 'their trivial sentences,
their petty standards, their low suspicions, their loveless ennui, may be making somebody
else's life no better than a promenade through a pantheon of ugly idols' (672). Lack of concern
for humanity, denoted here as the absence of love, is directly linked to boredom/want of
purpose in life.
Eliot portrays Gwendolen's restlessness and ennui as part of her initially amoral nature. At the
very beginning of the novel, Deronda questions whether the power of Gwendolen's gaze
resides in the 'good or the evil genius dominant in those beams'; and concludes that the 'evil'
is in fact dominant 'else why the effect of unrest?' (7). Though this as much a critique of
Deronda's naive perceptions and the equally naive society which expects women to suppress
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rather than develop their intellects, it is also a statement on the correlation between immoral
actions and the want of creative or intellectual quests. There is a crucial difference, however,
between the way ennui functions in Gwendolen and the manner in which it operates in
Grandcourt; in Gwendolen it produces restlessness, but Grandcourt's response is further to
withdraw from life. Lydia Glasher's letter provides valuable insights into Grandcourt's
psychology: 'The man you have married has a withered heart. His best young love was mine
[ .. .]' (359). Grandcourt's thought processes show that his intellect too is withered, 'a condition
which comes like whitening hair [... J like the main trunk of an exorbitant egoism' (319).
Whitening hair entails the death of pigment in the root of a hair follicle and a consequent loss
of colour; and the tree imagery 'main trunk' also supports the idea that Eliot believed
consciousness to be grounded in something larger than itself. Because Grandcourt's is only
rooted in his own 'exorbitant egoism' and nothing larger than itself, his consciousness becomes
static. The connection between 'heart' or a larger moral nature, and imagination is indefatigable
in Eliot. Theophrastus finds an irrefutable connection between these two concepts and
emphasizes the importance of 'ennobling emotions which subdue the tyranny of suffering, and
make ambition one with social virtue' (84). Ambition is always imaginative and it is always
wedded to the desire to inspire these values in others. Theophrastus insists that the man whose
work is a 'negation of those moral sensibilities which make half the warp and woof of human
history' cannot 'be taken, even by his own generation, as a living proof that there can exist such
a combination as that of moral stupidity and trivial emphasis on personal indulgence'
(Impressions 136). To George Eliot, there is an irreconcilable gulf between low morale and
creative genius; that is why she presents Grandcourt as ghostlike, he is already spiritually and
mentally dead so that all that remains of him are ebbs of thought which move in circular
patterns. Grandcourt's sexual impulse then, joined with his fantasies of dominion and
humiliation, not only has the effect of diminishing Gwendolen's sense of self; it reduces him
to a mere ebbing impulse, a pulsation.
Simone de Beauvoir's essay Must We Burn Sade? identifies the same alienation in Sade, whose
work can be viewed as a constant effort to reconcile that sense of hopeless estrangement from
the rest of humanity with a wish to be somehow connected. De Beauvoir points out that Sade
'for all his sadism strove to compensate for the one necessary element which he lacked' (De
Beauvoir 32). De Beauvoir compares Sade's condition to an 'autism which prevented him
from ever forgetting himself or being genuinely aware of the reality of the other person' (De
Beauvoir 33). What De Beauvoir describes is not simply a consequence of egoism but a
deficiency in the imagination. Applied to Gwendolen and Grandcourt, it is obvious that
Gwendolen begins life as ego-driven but not without the creative intellect requisite in order to
imagine and thereby empathize with another's suffering. Grandcourt fails at putting another's
needs ahead of his own and at even the very act of fully envisaging the effects his cruelties will
have on another's consciousness. Sadism and masochism are both efforts on the part of a
diminished consciousness to feel again; in De Beauvoir's words, 'If the subject remains
confined within the solitude of his consciousness, he escapes this agitation and can rejoin the
other only by conscious performance' (33). The performative aspect of desire, clearly a feature
of Sade's writing, also applies to Grandcourt's spectator mentality: he likes Lush to watch him
mistreat Fetch (125); he likes Gwendolen to wear Lydia Glasher's diamonds in public (427).
Clearly this exhibitionistic aspect of Grandcourt's sadism is what most gratifies him:
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Grandcourt had an intense satisfaction in leading his wife captive after this
fashion: it gave their life on a small scale a royal representation and pUblicity
in which everything familiar was gotten rid of, and everybody must do what
was expected of them whatever might be their private protest-(the protest
kept strictly private) adding to the piquancy of despotism (672)
Grandcourt has changed from a younger man who might have loved Lydia Glasher (in her
perception, he had loved her so this question is effectively posed) to a man who lives solely for
the pleasures of 'representation' and the thrilling contrast between what is public and what
remains veiled.
There is an unmistakable similitude between Grandcourt and Lapidoth, who had 'travelled a
long way' from his 'young self', and to whom emotion is now like 'the ocular perception of
touch to one who has lost the sense of touch, or like morsels on an untasting palette, having
shape and grain, but no flavour' (Deronda 742). The narrator refers to masochism as a
preferable and even welcome alternative to this condition: the loss of emotion and human
sympathy is likened to a 'slow death' where one 'longs to feel laceration rather than be
conscious of a widening margin where consciousness once was' (742). Baldassarre, too, has
reached this reduced state: the only way he retains his identity is through his identification with
his hatred. This loathing becomes his only source of human contact and so he declares 'I am
not alone in the world; 1 shall never be alone, for my revenge is with me' (Romola 256).
Sentiments of sadism and masochism are married in Baldassarre's fantasy of 'an eternity of
vengeance, where he, an undying hate, might clutch forever an undying traitor' (257-258).
There is no happiness in this condition, but there is a sharing of misery which appeals to
Baldassarre; and it is notable that Eliot's language reduces Baldassarre to only an emotion, he
is 'undying hate' rather than simply the custodian to such animosity. Eliot without doubt looks
upon the passion of hatred more favourably than she does the impartial and cold emotions of
Lapidoth and Grandcourt. Grandcourt, Lapidoth, and Baldassarre are varying forms of a
devolutionary process: Baldassarre is still linked to humanity by his passionately realized hate;
Lapidoth is numbed but not prone to cruelty, only egoism; Grandcourt is insensate to the point
of having entirely lost his soul to some phantom form of consciousness.
To be sure, Eliot meant these characters to serve as a warning that the more one detaches from
the collective consciousness, the greater the chance one takes that one's own consciousness
will be erased. That could have happened to Gwendolen but her love for Deronda prevents it.
She starts with the Sadiean belief that 'whatever surrounded her was somehow specially for
her' (Daniel Deronda 804) but the imaginative intellect she possesses innately grows more
powerful the more her consciousness is thrust into being by extreme suffering. She comes into
the recognition of suffering as a 'collective risk' by her own frightful introduction to it and
attempts to accept her 'amazed anguish that 1 and not Thou, He or She, should be just the
smitten one' (289). By the end of the novel, Gwendolen has completely transcended her
previous incarnation of self and like Romola, experiences 'the peaceful melancholy which
comes from the renunciation of the demands of self' and takes comfort from the 'more starlike
out-glowing of some pure fellow-feeling, some generous impulse breaking our inner darkness'
(795). This seeming diminishment of Gwendolen's former liveliness is seen as preferable to her
previous rowdy egoism; 1 believe Eliot intends Gwendolen's melancholy to be seen as a latent
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period, a rest after all her agonies that will allow her to meet her full creative and human
potential later.
Eliot's philosophy comes closest to the surface during a telling conversation between Mirah
and Mordecai over the emotions of a Jewish maiden in a tale Mordecai cites from the Midrash.
It is likely Eliot favoured Mordecai's claim that the maiden's sacrifice of her self illustrated
'surpassing love that loses self in the object of love' over Mirah's counter-argument that the
maiden 'had wanted the king to know what she had done and to feel that she was better than
the other', that 'it was her strong self, wanting to conquer, that made her die' (735). Mordecai
chides his sister, 'Thou hast read too many plays, where the writers delight in showing the
human passions as indwelling demons, unmixed with the relenting and devout elements of the
soul' (735).
It is obvious that Eliot herself, unlike the unidentified French writers in Impressions, was

keenly interested in showing both 'the indwelling demons' and the 'the relenting and devout
elements of the human soul'; but that her life's work was geared toward advocating the latter.
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